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NADINE GIGLIOTTI, a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, v. JOSEPH ERNES'l' NUNES, Respondent; 
BHODA GIGLIOTTI, Cross-Defendant and Appellant. 
[So F. No. 19201. In Bank. Aug. 23, 1955.] 
ARTHUR MATTS, a Minor, etc., et aI., Plaintiffs and Ap-
pellants, v. JOSEPH ERNEST NUNES, Respondent; 
RHODA GIGLIOTTI, Cross-Defendant and Appellant. 
Pl Automobiles-Judicial Notice.-It is a matter of common 
knowledge that one of the most hazardous of highway traffic 
maneuvers is a left turn by a ponderous, slow-moving vehicle 
in the face of oncoming traffic. 
[S] Death - Instructions - Presumptions. - Where testimony re-
specting alleged negligent acts and oonduct of a decedent 
necessarily must be produced by witnesses other than deceased, 
an instruction that deceased is presumed to have exercised 
ordinary care for his own concerns is proper except that if the 
fact proved by uncontradicted testimony produced by the 
party seeking to invoke the presumption, under circumstances 
which afford no indication that such testimony is the product 
of mistake or inadvertence, is wholly irreconcilable with the 
presumption, the presumption is dispelled. 
(8] Negligence-Presumptions.-Although there is no room for 
the presumption that a person takes ordinary care for his own 
eoncerns where the driver or other person whose claimed negli-
gence is at issue himself testifies to his actions at the time 
involved, if such person be deceased or unable to testify by 
reason of loss of memory, the fact that other witnesses for 
the parties testify fully as to the acts and conduct of the 
allegedly negligent person does not deprive the party relying 
on the presumption of the benefit thereof unless the testimony 
which he himself produces, under circumstances which afford 
no indication that the testimony is the product of mistake or 
inadvertence, is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption 
sought to be invoked • 
• 
[8] See Oal.Juf., Negligence, § 122; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 290 
~~ p 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 188; [2] Death, § 84; 
[3] Negligence, §124; [4] Df'uth, ~42: f5] Autolllobiles, ~189j 
[6, 7] Automobiles, § 385-2; [8] Automobiles, § 355-2; [9] Plead-









GIGLIOTTI V. NUNES [45 C.2d 
Death-Wrongful Death-Presumptions.-In an action brought 
to recover for the wrongful death of an automobile driver, the 
presumption that a person takes ordinary care for his own con-
cerns would apply if contributory negligence by the driver 
were made an issue. 
Automobiles-Presumptions.-In an action for damages aris-
ing out of a collision of vehicles resulting in the death of the 
person driving the car in which plaintiffs were riding, no pre-
sumption of due care on the part of the deceased driver would 
carry with it the presumption of negligence on the part of 
defendant. 
Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions - Presumptions. 
-In an action for injuries sustained by.minors when the auto-
mobile in which they were riding as guests collided with a 
truck which had started to make a left turn at an intersection, 
refusal to give plaintiffs' requested instruction on the pre-
sumption of due care on the part of the automobile driver, 
who was killed in the collision, constituted prejudicial error 
where, though the jury were instructed that any negligence of 
deceased driver could not be imputed to plaintiffs, the conduct 
of such driver was important in determining whether the truck 
driver's conduct was negligent, and where the evidence was 
in sharp conflict as to some circumstances of the accident and 
would have supported a verdict other than one for defendant. 
Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions - Presumptions. 
-In an action for injuries sustained by minors when the auto-
mobile in which they were riding collided with a truck at an 
intersection, to which defendant filed a cross-complaint against 
the mother of two of the minors, who was also riding in the 
automobile, for damage to the truck, defendant's recovery 
against the mother was based on alleged negligence of the 
automobile driver, imputed to her, and refusal to give her re-
quested instruction on the presumption of due care on the 
part of such driver, who was killed in the collision, was prej-
udicial error. 
Id.-Instructions-Presumptions.-In an action for injuries 
sustained by minors when the automobile in which they were 
riding collided with a truck at an intersection, plaintiffs' 
proposed instruction that the presumption of ordinary care on 
tke part of the automobile driver, who was killed in the col-
lision, "shall prevail and control your deliberations until and 
unless it is overcome by sati~factory evidence" could not con-
fuse the jury as implying that defendant had the burden of 
"overcoming" such presumption and that "overcome" could 
only mean by a preponderance of evidence, where such instruc-
tion did not mention either "burden of proof" or "prep onder-
&Ilce of evidence-" 
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[9] Pleading-Amendment-Tillle to ADlt:nd.-Refu3al to permit 
a cross-defendant to amend her answer to a truck owne7s 
cross-complaint for damages 'to his truck arising out of a 
collision of vehicles, so as to set up failure of the truck owner 
to file a cross-complaint in a prior action brought against him 
by such cross-defendant, did not constitute an abuse of dis-
cretion where on two prior occasions, when counsel for cress-
complainant offered the file of the prior action in evidence in 
an attempt to prove that the judgment in his favor therein 
was res judicata on the question of his negligence, counsel for 
cross-defendant objected on the ground that such file or e.ny-
thing in connection with the previous trial was incompetent, 
irrelevant and immaterial, and where the court on the first 
occasion pointed out that the prior judgment was consistent 
with no negligence on the part of either cross-complainant or 
the driver of the other vehicle and, on the second occasion, the 
court reserved its ruling with the comment that if it allowed 
the records of the prior action, it might force cross-com-
plainant out of court, and counsel for cross-defendant did 
Dot then promptly amend the answer. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County. John D. Foley, Judge. Reversed. 
Actions for damages for personal injuries arising out of a 
collision of vehicles at an intersection, in which defendant 
filed a cross-complaint for damages to his truck. JUdgment 
entered on a verdict dellying recovery against defendant on 
original complaint, and judgment for defendant on cross-
complaint, reversed. 
James F. Boccardo and Edward J. Niland for Appellants. 
Campbell, Custer, Warburton & Britton, Frank L. Custer 
and W. R. Dunn for Respondent. 
SCRA UER, J .-In these two personal injury actions, aris-
ing out of a motor vehicle accident and consolidated for trial, 
the four plaintiffs as well as the cross-defendant Mrs. Rhoda 
Gigliotti appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict deny-
ing recovery against defendant, Joseph Edward Nunes, for 
the personal injuries and awarding him judgment ag~inst 
Mrs. Gigliotti on his cross-complaint for damages to his truck. 
We have concluded that plaintiffs and Mrs. Gigliotti are cor-
rect in their contention that the trial court committed error 
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on the presumption of due care and that the judgment must 
therdore be reYel'sed, ann. further, that no abuse of dis-
erEtion is shown in the comt's refusal to permit Mrs. Gig-
lict~j to file a proffered amendment to her answer to the cross-
complaint. 
• In November, 1947, a 1946 Dodge sedan in which plaintiffs 
(milJors at the time) were riding as guests collided with a 
truck vwned and operated by defendant and cross-complainant, 
Joseph Nunes. The Dodge was being driven by one Walters 
who died as a result of injuries received. Nunes' answer to 
plaintiffs' amended complaints denied negligence generally, 
and pleaded affirmative defenses of contributory negligence, 
,~~;~mmption of risk, imputed negligence of the driver of the 
Dodge, unavoidable accident, res judicata and estoppel. Plain-
tiffs' motions to strike the latter two defenses were grallted. 
Nunes also filed a crosG-complaint for damages to his truck 
against the minor plaintiffs in both actions and brought in as 
an additional cross-defendant Rhoda Gigliotti, mother of 
two of the plaintiffs. In the cross-complaint it is alleged that 
Walters, driver of the Dodge, operated it negligently while 
acting as the servant, agent and employe of the cross-de-
fendants. l 
At the conclusion of the trial motions for nonsuit on the 
cross-complaint were granted as to the minor cross-defendants 
but denied as to Mrs. Gigliotti. Verdict and judgment fol-
lowed in favor of defendant Nunes and against plaintiffs as 
to the causes of action alleged in the complaint, and also in 
favor of Nunes for $300 on his cross-complaint against Mrs. 
Gigliotti. Motions of plaintiffs and Mrs. Gigliotti for a new 
trial were denied. 
As grounds for reversal plaintiffs2 urge error in the instruc-
tions, and prejudicial misconduct of defendants' counsel. 
Mi'3. Gigliotti als~ contends that the court should have per-
mitted her to plead or prove that the cause of action stated in 
the cross-complaint against her was barred by reason of de-
fendant's failure to plead it in a prior action she had brought 
against him (see Code Civ. Proc., § 439). 
IThe record indicates that the Dodge was owned by neither Walters nor 
Mrs. Gigliotti, but by a third person who is not a party to these actions. 
The basis of Nunes' recovery against Mrs. Gigliotti on his cross-complaint 
is his claim that Walters was acting as her agent in driving the Dodge. 
'In discussing the contentions made on appeal the word" plaintiffs" 
will also refer to cross-defendant MIa. Gigliotti unleaa oth@lwiae ill· 
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The accident occurred about 3 p. m. at the intel's~ctiO:l of 
Bayshore Highway and Berryes!:ia Road ill 81m Jose. At this 
point Bayshore runs north and south and is divided into three 
lanes, each 11 feet wide. On each side is an asphalt shoulder 
9 feet wide. Berryessa Road crosses Bay£hore at about a 4·5 
degree angle, running from southeast to northwest, and is 
divided into two lanes, each 9 feet wide. Berryt-::;:.;a widens 
out into a curve on each side where it joins the shoulders of 
Bayshore. Approximately 40 feet south of the center of the 
intersection, railroad tracks cross Bayshore at an angle, run-
ning parallel to Berryessa. On each side of the tracks, aL:.Hlt 
10 or 12 feet distant therefrom, and parallel thereto, are 
double white lines extending across the center and right lanes 
of each approach on Bayshore to the railroad crossing. 
Defendant Nunes was driving his true!; and trailer south 
on Bayshore, intending to turn left into Berryessa. The truck 
was about 32 feet in length, and attached to it by a tiebar was 
a trailer, 23 feet 10 inches in length, equipped with cattle 
racks. The overall length of the equipment was 59 feet 10 
inches, and it weighed more than 19,500 pounds. The Dodge 
sedan driven by Walters, in which plaintiffs and Mrs. Gig-
liotti were riding and with an empty horse trailcr attached, 
was proceeding north on Bayshore. Mrs. Gigliotti and one 
of the plaintiffs were in the front seat beside 'Valters and the 
other three plaintiffs were in the back seat. As defendant's 
truck turned left onto Berryessa it and the Dodge collided. 
As a result Mrs. Gigliotti and the plaintiffs suffered personal 
injuries and, as already noted, Walters was fatally injured. 
Evidence as to the circumstances of the accident is in sharp 
conflict. Defendant testified that he had been driving u3tween 
12 and 15 miles an hour, in the center lane of Bayshore, and 
Elowed down as he reached the Berryessa intersection. A 
. "good block" from Berrye£sa he put the mechanical arm sig-
nal of his truck out for a left turn, and left it there. He saw 
two groups of automobiles approaching from the south, the 
first consisting of two or three cars traveling at an "ordinary 
speed" of 40 to 50 miles an hour; they were an "ordinary 
driving distance" apart. The second group consisted of 
three cars, the first of which was 700 to 800 feet behind the 
last car of the first group. Defendant paid no attentiorl to 
the speed of the cars in the second group. He was 200 or 
300 feet from the intersection when the first car of the first 
group reached it. He stopped or nearly stopped when he 
reached the intersection just as the last car of the first group 
) 
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passed through it. rrhe first car of the second group was 
then about 800 feet from the intersection. Defendant put 
his truck in gear to begin the left turn; just before he started 
it he saw the Dodge pulling the horse trailer come out from 
be~illd the first two northbound cars and pass them in the 
middle lane; defendant paid no attention to the speed of the 
Dodge at that time. At a previous trial he testified that he 
had already made part of the turn before looking to the right 
again. The Dodge, 600 or 700 feet from Berryessa when it 
passed the two cars, pulled back into the east lane. \Vhen de-
fendant was in the center of the east lane he saw the Dodge 
about 300 to 350 feet away and estimated its speed at 65 
miles an hour. Defendant started to apply his brakes; he 
knew he could not get out of the way in time. The Dodge 
did not diminish its speed, but at about the railroad tracks 
swerved to the right in an attempt to go in front of defend-
ant's truck. The vehicles collided when the front of the truck 
was about 2 feet east of the Bayshore pavement. Defendant 
did not know whether his truck was moving or stopped at 
that moment, but if moving it was at no more than 3 miles 
an hour. From the time he had seen the Dodge 300 to 350 feet 
down Bayshore the truck had gone about 8 feet, and from 
the point where it had commenced the left turn into the east 
lane it had traveled from 12 to 15 feet at 3 miles an hour to 
the point of impact. The truck was moved 3 or 4 feet sideways 
by the impact, and the vehicles came to rest with about three-
quarters of the left side of the truck's bumper imbedded in the 
Dodge. Defendant denied that he had told anyone that he had 
never seen the Dodge. 
One Fowler, testifying for defendant, stated that he was 
in his car at the stop sign on Berryessa on the east side of 
Bayshore when he saw defendant's equipment approaching. 
The left turn signaling arm was straight out, indicating a 
left turn, although it was pointing downward after the acci-
dent. The witness first saw the Dodge about 500 feet south, 
going about 55 miles an hour, and saw no cars go through 
the intersection before the Dodge. Defendant's truck was 
traveling 10 to 1::! miles an hour and started to turn with no 
change in speed. The Dodge was then 150 to 200 feet from 
the intersection and still traveling at the same speed. As soon 
as the truck started to turn the witness knew the accident 
was going to happen because the Dodge was so close that 
defendant could not get his 60-foot truck and trailer across in 
front of it. As the truck reached the east lane the witness 
) 
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saw the Dodge start to swerve to its right; when the front of 
the truck was in the middle of the east lane the Dodge was 
150 or 200 feet from the intersection. A highway patrol officer 
testified, however, that the witness Fowler told him at the 
scene of the accident that he, Fowler, could give no informa-
tion because he had been watching the truck make its turn 
and had not seen the Dodge; Fowler denied this. 
Other witnesses for defendant testified that his signaling 
device was out for a left turn, that the Dodge had been trav-
eling about 45 miles an hour possibly a block or half a block 
from Berryessa, and that its speed at the moment of impact 
was about 50 miles an hour. 
Truck driver Whittaker testified, for plaintiffs, that he had 
been driving east on Berryessa, toward Bayshore, and first 
saw defendant's truck north of the intersection and traveling 
at 20 to 25 miles an hour. Defendant's truck slowed down 
and meanwhile two northbound cars on Bayshore went through 
the intersection. Just after the second car passed, the truck 
began to turn left right in front of the Dodge; the Dodge was 
then about 80 feet south of the intersection, near the railroad 
tracks, and moving between 40 and 45 miles an hour. The 
truck, which was going 4 to 5 miles an hour when it began 
the left turn, picked up speed until it was traveling 8 to 10 
miles an hour at the moment of impact. The Dodge veered to 
the right when the truck began to turn and traveled about 
64 feet to the point of impact; it was then going 35 to 40 miles 
an hour. The left front bumper of the truck hit the left front 
side of the car and moved the car sideways 4 or 5 feet. The 
Dodge left tire marks 4 to 5 feet long extending easterly from 
the point of impact; it also left "skid marks" behind it to the 
south. After the collision the witness asked defendant why 
he had pulled out in front of the Dodge and defendant replied 
that he didn't see it. 
Two other witnesses testified that they heard defendant 
state, at the scene of the accident, that he had let two other 
cars go by but had not seen the Dodge. The witness Penny, 
also testifying for plaintiffs, stated he was driving behind 
defendant, was still behind him when defendant's truck start-
ed to turn left, and saw no mechanical or arm signal indicating 
an intent to turn left; just before the truck started the left 
turn the witness saw the Dodge at about the railroad tracks 
traveling 40 to 45 miles an hour; he noticed the Dodge be-
cause he "knew it was awful close for the truck to try to 
) 
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tIll'll"; tilt' ~,'ft-halld ~iJe u1 the truck hit the Dodge, pushing 
tJw "La' sit:, ways about 3 feet. 
Pia intir!' Arthur Matts, who was riding in the front seat 
of tilt' Dodge, testified that the Dodge had been \raveling about 
40 Illiles au hour a block or two before the accident; he esti-
~lateu that the truck was about 150 feet north of the inter-
section when he first saw it and the Dodge some 150 or more 
feet south of the intersection; when the Dodge reached the 
railroad tracks the truck began to turn left right in front of 
the Dodge; he felt the Dodge swerve to the right and felt 
the application of the brakes; he was knocked out by the 
collision and did not see the two vehicles come together or 
know where the impact occurred. Mrs. Gigliotti placed the 
speed of the Dodge at about 35 to 40 miles an hour along 
BaysllOre, and also testified that the truck turned left when 
the Dodge was about 50 feet south of it, near the railroad 
tracks, and Walters then applied the brakes of the Dodge. Of 
tIlt' other three minor plaintiffs two had no memory concern-
ing the happening of the accident, and the third testified the 
Douge was going about 35 miles an hour and was about 
at the middle of Berryessa Road when the truck turned in 
front of it. 
Although other evidence also favors each of the parties, 
it is apparent from that summarized above that while the 
jury's veruict for dcfcndant is not as a matter of law un-
supported by the evidence, a verdict in favor of plaintiffs and 
of Mrs. Gigliotti would find substantial support in the testi-
monies of defendant. himself, and his witnesses and in the 
physical circumstances as well as in the evidence produced 
by and on behalf of the plaintiffs. [1] It bears mention as 
a matter of common knowledge that one of the most hazard-
oml of all highway tl'afJic maneuvers is a left turn by a pon-
derons, slow moving vehicle in the face of oncoming traffic. 
As ground for reversal, it is first contended that the court 
erred in refusing to give plaintiffs' requested instruction on 
the presumption of due care (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963. subd. 4) 
on the part of Walters, the deceased driver of the Dodge. 
[~] As expressed in Scott v. Burke (1952). 39 Ca1.2d 388, 
:~0-1 [247 P.2d 313], it is settled lmv that whel.'e alleged negli-
gent acts and conduct of a decedent are at issue before the 
court and the "testimony respecting such acts and conduct 
necessarily must be produced by witnesses other than the de-
ceased, ... an instruction that the deceased is pt'csumed to 
have exercised ordinary CUl't! for his OWll COllcerus iii ••• 
) 
) 
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proper" except that if the fact proved by uncontradicted testi-
mony produced by the party se~king to invoke the prc:mmp-
tion "under circumstances which afford no indication that , 
the testimony is the product of mistake or inadvertence .•• 
is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption ••• the latter 
is dispelled and disappears from the case." 
[3] Although there is no room for the presumption where 
the driver or other person whose claimed negligence is at 
issue himself testifies to his actions at the time involved (see 
Speck v. Sarver (1942),20 Ca1.2d 585, 587-588 l128 P.2d 16]), 
the rule is established that if such person be deceased or un-
able to testify by reason of loss of memory, the fact that other 
witnesses for the parties testify fully as to the acts and con-
duct of the. allegedly negligent person does not deprive the 
party relying on the presumption of the benefit thereof un-
less the testimony which he himself produces "under circum-
stances which afford no indication that the testimony is the 
product of mistake or inadvertence ... is wholly irreconcil-
able with the presumption sought to be invoked." (W eslberg 
v. Will de (1939),14 Ca1.2d 360,365-368 [94 P.2d 590J ; Mar 
Shee v. Maryland Assur. Om·p. (1922), 190 Cal. 1, 9 l210 P. 
269J; Ohakmakjian v. Lowe (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 308, 313 [201 
P.2d 801J.) Plaintiffs' evidence in the present case is not 
irreconcilable with the presumption. 
The benefit of the presumption has frequently been held 
available to plaintiffs in wrongful death act.ions (t;ee A11lhony 
v. Hobbie (1945), 25 Ca1.2d 814, 819-820 [155 P.2d 826]; 
Westberg v. Willde (1939), supra, 14 Ca1.2d. 360; EUison v. 
Lang Transportation Co. (1938), 12 Ca1.2d 355, 358-360 [84 P. 
2d 510] ; Mundy v. Marshall (1937),8 Ca1.2d 294 [65 P.2d 65] ; 
Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co. (1931), 212 Cal. 540 [299 P. 
529] ; see also Mar Shee v. Maryland Ass'Ur. Corp. (1922), 
supra, 190 Cal. 1), as well as to one who by reason of loss of 
memory is unable to testify concerning his conduct at and 
immediately before the time of the accident. (See Scott v. 
Burke (1952), supra, 39 Ca1.2d 388, 394, and cases there 
cited.) [4] In an action brought to recover for the wrong-
ful death of VI alters the presumption plainly woulJ apply 
if contributory negligence by ,\Valters \7,-e~e made an issue. 
[5] Since, however, it likewise is the rule that no 'pre-
sumption of due care on the part of the deceased driver \Val-
ters would carry with it the presumption of ncgligp}h;r 011 tile 
part of defendant Nlllle~; (see (Jreene v. A!ellf·son, 1'. & S. Jil. 
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40 A.L.R.2d 873]), and since in the present case the jury were 
instructed that any negligence of Walters could not be im-
puted to plaintiffs, defendant argues that there was no issue 
of negligence of Walters so far as concerns the minor plain-
tiffs. 
Plaintiffs urge that the conduct of Walters was important, 
nevertheless, in determining whether defendant's conduct was 
negligent (i.e., the speed and distance away of the Dodge 
driven by Walters and what defendant should have observed 
with respect to it before turning the truck left in front of the 
Dodge), and that if the due care presumption had been be-
fore the jury they might have concluded that Walters was 
not driving at an excessive or negligent speed, that he was 
observing the speed limit of 45 miles an hour for a passen-
ger motor vehicle drawing a trailer (established by Veh. 
Code, § 515.5, as to which an instruction was given), and (in 
view of the evidence that the Dodge left tire marl<:s some 30 or 
40 feet before the point of impact) that Walters must have 
been less than 100 feet from the point of impact when defend-
ant began his left turn. Hence the jury could have further 
concluded that defendant was negligent in attempting a left 
turn of his ponderous and slow moving equipment, approxi-
mately 60 feet in length, in front of another vehicle approach-
ing the intersection so closely as to constitute an immediate 
hazard, and that defendant's negligence in thus violating 
section 551 of the Vehicle Code (as to which an instruction 
was given) would be a proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. 
[6] Although no case had been cited or discovered wherein 
applicability of the presumption has been affirmed or denied 
upon a congeries of circumstances exactly the same as those 
here present, we are convinced that plaintiffs' position ac-
cords with the principles which have governed or underlain 
application of the rule in the cas¢,3 .:!ii.ed. Certainly nothing 
in section 1963 of the Code of Civil Procedure refutes that 
view. Because the evidence, as already shown: was in such 
sharp conflict as to some of the circumstances of the accident, 
and would have amply supported a different verdict, the error 
in refusing to give the due care presumption instruction is 
prejudicial. 
[7] With respect to the cross-defendant, Mrs. Gigliotti, de-
fendant's recovery against her was based upon alleged negli-
gence of Walters, imputed to her, and consequently the pre-
sumption was likewise applicable and prejudicial error re-
sulted from l'l'fusal to give it. 
Defend.ant, however, urges that the due care instruction of-
) 
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fered by plaintiffs was erroneous in that it would have tended 
to confuse the jury on the matter of burden of proof.s 
[8] Defendant argues that although admittedly the court 
correctly instructed the jury that the plaintiffs had the burden 
of proving the allegations of the complaint by a preponderance 
of evidence, nevertheless by the statement in plaintiffs' pro-
posed instruction that the presumption of ordinary care on 
the part of Walters "shall prevail and control your delibera-
tions until and unless it is overcome by satisfactory evidence" 
the jury would have understood that defendant had the bur-
den of "overcoming" the presumption and that "overcome' J 
could only mean by a preponderance of evidence. The due 
care instruction, however, does not mention either "burden 
of proof" or ' 'preponderance of evidence,' , and, further, 
the language attacked by defendant was expressly approved by 
this court in Westberg v. Willde (1939), supra, 14 Ca1.2d 
360, 364-365 (see also cases there cited). Thus the failure to 
give the instruction cannot be excused because of its form. 
Other alleged errors urged by plaintiffs as to jury instruc-
tions as well as asserted prejudicial misconduct on the part 
of counsel for defendant may not occur on a new trial and 
therefore need not be discussed here. 
[9] Finally, cross-defendant Mrs. Gigliotti contends that 
the trial court erred to her prejudice in refusing to permit her 
to plead or prove that the cross-complaint against her was 
barred by section 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure.4 After 
all parties had rested Mrs. Gigliotti asked leave to file an 
amendment to her answer to the cross-complaint to set forth a 
second defense alleging that the "cross-Complainant is es-
-The instruction as offered reads as follows: "I instruct you that 
there is a legal presumption that the deceased, Leonard Walters, was 
obeying the law at the time and place of the accident in question and 
that he was exercising ordinary care for his own concerns at the time 
and place of said accident. This presumption is in itself a species of 
evidence, and it shall prevail and control your deliberations until and 
unless it is overcome by satisfactory evidence. This presumption is dis-
putable, but unless it is adequately and sufficiently controverted, you, 
the jury, are bound to find in accordance with the presumption that the 
deceased, Leonard Walters, was obeying the law and was exercising 
ordinary care for his own concerns and was not negligent at the time 
and place of the accident. It is evidence in the ease and is sufficient 
in and of itself to support a verdict of finding on your part that the 
said deceased was careful at the time and place of the accident in 
question. " 
·Section 439: ' 'If the defendant omits to set up a counterclaim upon 
a cause arising out of the transaetion set forth in the complaint as tIle 
foundation of the plaintiff's claim. neither he nor hi~ ansignee can 
afterwards maintain an action against the plaintiff therefor." 
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tOlJP;'(l 1'1'0111 asserting the matters set forth in said Cross-
COIII[lLiiilt ullder the provi~ions of Section 439 of the Code 
of Ci\·il Procedure ... ; that the issues and matters set forth 
in sai,l (~I.·oss-Complaint arise out of the same transaction and 
~lecid('lIt as was litigated in a prior action entitled, 'Rhoda 
n ig·J iotti ... , Plaintiffs, versus Joseph Ernest Nunes ... , 
Dd('llllullts,' and numbered 69532 in the files of this Court, 
and that in said prior action said Cross-Complainant was en-
t.itled to, but failed to, assert the matters now set forth in said 
Cross-Complaint." Counsel for Mrs. Gigliotti in offering the 
amendment stated his recognition that "it lies within the 
Court's discretion to permit an amendment of the pleadings, 
of course," and at the same time stated that "in support of 
th(~ proof under the amendment, if allowed, I would like to 
introduce for the limited purpose of this defense and for no 
other purpose, the action filed, Action No. 69532, which estab-
lishes the prior . . . fail ure of the . . . Cross-Complainant 
to set up any Cross-Complaint in that action •.. " The court 
denied kave to file the amendment. 
No abuse of the court's' discretion in so ruling appears. 
The record shows that on two occasions during the trial 
counsel for Nunes offered the file of the prior action between 
Mrs. Gigliotti and Nunes in evidence in an attempt to prove 
that the judgment in Nunes' favor therein was res judicata 
on the issue of Nunes' negligence and actually adjudicated 
negligence 011 the part of \Valters, driver of the Dodge. On 
both occasions counsel for Mrs. Gigliotti objected vigorously 
on the ground that the files or "anything in connection with 
the previous trial ... is incompetent, irrelevant and im-
material ... " On the first occasion the court pointed out 
that the prior judgment was likewise consistent with no negli-
gence ou the part of either Nunes or Walters and denied the 
otter of proof. On the second occasion the court reserved 
it~, ruling, with the comment that if it allowed -the records of 
the prior action in evidence it might force Nunes out of court 
on his cross-complaint, "as apparently it is conceded" that 
the prior action arose out of the same accident. Counsel for 
l'\'IrS. Gigl iotti did not then take advantage of the court's 
(:Ollllllent to attempt to promptly amend her answer to the 
eross-compJaillt, but instead waited until all of the evidence 
was in and both sides had resteu. Even if we assume that 
if the file had been permitted in evidence Mrs. Gigliotti could 
have taken advantage of it to establish that Nunes' cross-




prior action and so was barred (see Blumenthal v. Liebman 
(In::;2), 109 CaI.App.2d 374, 378-379 [240 P.2tl 699]), never-
theless, under the circumstances we cannot hold that as a 
matter of law the trial court transgressed the broad area of 
its discretion in refusing permission to file the amendment. 
For the reasons above stated the judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
TRA YNOR, J.-I dissent. 
Defendant Nunes had the burden of proving that the de-
ceased driver Walters was negligent. Accordingly, there is 
no basis for invoking a presumption against defendant that 
Walters was exercising due care. (See Speck v. Sarver, 20 
Cal.2d 585, 590 [128 P.2d 16], dissenting opinion; Scott v. 
Burke, 39 Ca1.2d 388, 402 [247 P.2d 313], dissenting opinion.) 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September 
21, 1955. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
